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Abstract: In the mandatory health insurance market in Switzerland, a range of insurers offer policies
that differ in characteristics like premium and service level while benefits are the same and regulated
by law. In this paper, we give an overview of the market and analyse the relationship between insurers’
characteristics and the evolution of their market shares. Indeed, in view of substantial differences
between the players, the risk that policyholders change their provider is important. We develop
a linear model with two-sided lognormally distributed errors and use publicly available data on
the Swiss mandatory health insurance market for the years from 2002 to 2015. Thereby we identify
and quantify the main drivers for the policyholders’ switching behavior that reflect in changes in
market shares. The results suggest that market share changes are particularly linked to the difference
between an insurer’s premium and the overall market premium. In addition, the difference to the
previous year’s premium also has an impact on the market share while the service level as well as the
group affiliation of a provider turn out not be significant in explaining annual market share changes.
Keywords: health insurance; Swiss insurance market; market share; linear model; two-sided log
normal distribution
1. Introduction
Health insurance systems around the world face major challenges including increasing
expenditures and a growing number of elderly leading to a growth of premiums that lies above
GDP’s growth. According to the OECD Health Statistics Groninger and Lacher (2017), the average
expenditure for health-related services in 2016 was 9% of the GDP in OECD countries. In Switzerland
it increased from 9.4% in 1999 to 12.4% in 2016 and in the US it amounted to 17.2% in 2016. While the
GDP in Switzerland only grew by 90% and the population by 23% from 1990 to 2014, overall healthcare
costs grew by 165% in the same period.
In this paper, we are interested in better understanding the development of health insurers’
size and to link this evolution to the pricing decisions in the mandatory health insurance market
in Switzerland. We formulate a model for the impact of the premium decisions on the individual
insurer’s market share and test it on publicly available data. In fact, insurers operate in a competitive
and highly regulated market that has gone through a process of consolidation and a major reduction of
the number of players over the last years. Decreasing lapse risk from existing customers and attracting
the better risks are strategic concerns. There are numerous studies in different countries regarding
the influence of price changes, service level, number of available insurance plans, the health situation
and the age of the insureds on the health plan consumer’s choice. Schut et al. (2003) compare the
switching behaviour of insureds in Germany and in the Netherlands. They show that in Germany,
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insureds react more sensitively to an increase of premium than in the Netherlands. They also find that
older policyholders are less sensitive to increasing premiums than younger ones. Christiansen et al.
(2016) analyse the policyholders’ switching behaviour in the German private health insurance market.
Their findings show that a premium change and its adjustment frequency relate to the switching
behaviour of customers between insurers. Schmitz and Ziebarth (2017) use field data to test the
effect of price framing on the switching rates in the German health insurance market. They find that
presenting differences between the insurer’s premium and a federal reference premium in absolute
Euro values instead of percentage points of the gross salary, results in increasing switching rates. In the
Dutch health insurance market, Boonen et al. (2015) test the effect of premium and quality rating of
the insurer on the switching decision of the insureds. Other studies such as Strombom et al. (2002)
and Goldman et al. (2004) also investigate the effect of the price on the insureds’ health insurance
choice. Schmeiser (2014) study the perception of risk factors and gender-related price differences
in several European countries and insurance products including Switzerland and health insurance.
A game-theoretic approach to model pricing decisions and lapse rates of policyholders as a function of
the different players’ premium decisions is suggested by Dutang et al. (2013), see also Albrecher (2016)
and Albrecher and Daily-Amir (2017) for including asymmetric information in the analysis.
Studies on decision making find that more options to choose from is linked with
inertia. Decision makers tend to avoid taking a decision and stay with the current choice
(see e.g., Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988)). Eling and Kiesenbauer (2011) and Hellier et al. (2003)
suggest the number of different insurance models and the rate of complementary insurance holders as
explanatory variables to the switching behaviour of the insureds. Frank and Lamiraud (2009) discover
that the large number of plans, offered by a large number of players in the Swiss health insurance
market, contributes to the relatively low switching rate and large premium differences. They find
evidence that policyholders who stay with the same health plan provider for longer periods are less
likely to switch plans, representing a certain degree of inertia. In another study on German health
insurance, Wuppermann et al. (2014) test the effect of the number of available health insurance plans
and their respective premium differences on the premium sensitivity of the insureds. They also find
that insureds are less likely to switch to a lower priced plan when they have more plans to choose from.
In terms of linking customer satisfaction and loyalty to their service provider, conclusions are
unclear. For example, Abraham et al. (2016) report that they did not find a connection between
health plan satisfaction and switching behaviour, for which high switching costs are suggested as a
possible reason. In the studies by Staudt and Wagner (2018) and Mau et al. (2018), the authors analyse
customer loyalty, the development of relationships and purchase in the non-life insurance market in
Switzerland. They link purchase behaviour to the services and channels used. Among other factors to
explain switching behaviour, Browne and Hofmann (2013) find evidence that low-risk policyholders
are more likely to change health plans. In the Spanish health insurance market, Pinquet et al. (2011)
find evidence that insufficient information about the available insurance plans causes the insureds
to lapse.
In our research we aim to study the influence of premiums, group affiliation and service level on
the switching behavior of policyholders in Swiss health insurance. Since cross-company records about
individuals switching their insurer are not available, we consider the market share as response variable.
We use data covering a period of 14 years, from 2002 to 2015, containing portfolio size, premiums
and service level for each insurer in each of the 26 Swiss cantons. Applying linear regression models,
the results suggest that the relative difference between insurer’s premium and market premium
represent a significant factor to explain changes in market share. The difference between the relative
annual change in the premium and the relative annual change in the market premium is another
significant factor while our study does not indicate a significant impact on market share changes from
service level and group affiliation. We also establish that those sensitivities vary considerably among
cantons. We find that residuals in the regression are rather two-sided lognormally distributed than
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normally distributed, and develop a corresponding statistical procedure for this case, which may be of
interest in its own right.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the Swiss Health
insurance market, Section 3 then describes the research questions and the available dataset, discusses
limitations and states the model assumptions. Section 4 contains the results and Section 5 concludes.
Details on the methodology for our linear model with lognormal residuals are given in the Appendix A.
2. The Swiss Health Insurance Market
Buying a basic health insurance policy is compulsory for all Swiss residents since 1996 with the
introduction of the Swiss Federal law on health insurance (see Swiss Confederation (1994)). The law
intended to deal with the increasing costs in the health sector while ensuring a high quality health
system, promoting freedom of choice and solidarity. It determines a mandatory health insurance for
all Swiss residents (Swiss Health Insurance Ordinance 832.102. (1995)) as a basic homogeneous cover
with defined benefits (Swiss Health Insurance Benefits Ordinance 832.112. (1995)), imposes reserve
levels to ensure the financial stability of the insurers, forces the acceptance of every person as a client
without screening and ensures the flexibility to change the insurance plan without switching costs
(Theurl (1999)). In terms of organization, although highly regulated, these social insurance plans are
offered by private insurance companies. The law sets limits on premium discounts between plans
(e.g., for deductibles chosen by policyholders) and forces the insurers to set premiums for each level
of deductible in a way that the cover of the insurance expenses does not result in a planned profit.
The government employs a risk adjustment scheme and transfers capital between insurers in order to
balance the financial situation across insurers. In that way, insurers facing higher medical expenses
due to their portfolio composition receive capital from insurers with a less risky pool of policyholders.
The governance of the health care system is done on a federal level by both the Swiss Federal
Office of Public Health (SFOH) and the Federal Department of Home Affairs (FDHA), and on a
cantonal level by the cantonal Departments of Public Health. The SFOH defines the mandatory health
insurance benefit basket, regulates the insurers and approves their premiums annually. The FDHA
defines up to three regions within a single canton for the premiums and sets the maximum differences
between them (Ordinance of the Federal Department of Home Affairs on Premium Regions 832.106
(2015)). The cantons supervise the hospitals and finance part of their expenses. They also define
premium reduction levels for households with lower incomes.
The 26 Swiss cantons differ considerably in terms of economic, political and demographic
characteristics. Table 1 summarises some characteristics for the most populated cantons in each
linguistic region with Zurich (ZH), Bern (BE) and Aargau (AG) from the German speaking region,
Vaud (VD) and Geneva (GE) from the French speaking region and Ticino (TI) as the Italian speaking
region as well as for the overall country (CH). For example, in 2016, the rate of population living
in urban areas was 100% in Geneva and only 74.6% in Bern. The number of physicians in private
practice per 100,000 people was more than twice as large in Geneva than in Bern. Differences like
these lead to variations among the cantons in the market structure, premium levels, competition and
switching rates.
An overview of the Swiss health insurance market is published every year by the SFOH and
key financial figures for the years 1998 to 2015 are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix A. One can
observe the reduction of the number of insurers, the large growth in premiums and expenditures and
the operating results alternating through years with positive and negative results. In the following
subsections we present the development since the introduction of the Federal health insurance law.
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Table 1. Economic and demographic data for selected cantons and Switzerland.
Canton AG BE GE TI VD ZH CH
Residents (2016) 663,462 1,026,513 489,524 354,375 784,822 1,487,969 8,419,550
Urban population in % (2016) 85.1 74.6 100.0 92.0 89.6 99.3 84.6
Unemployment rate in % (annual average 2017) 3.15 2.59 5.28 3.38 4.52 3.54 3.19
Physicians in private practice per 100 000 people (2017) 167 220 376 219 244 257 219
Hospital beds per 1000 people (2017) 4.5 4.8 5.2 5.4 4.8 4.2 4.5
Debt of the cantons in CHF per inhabitant (2016) 3542 6735 31,504 10,300 4382 5236 7640
Social assistance rate (2016) 2.2 4.2 5.7 2.8 4.8 3.2 3.3
Higher education rate (2016) 22.6 24.0 28.0 29.1 25.9 22.6 28.7
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2018).
2.1. Market Structure
The Swiss health insurance market is heterogeneous with insurance portfolio sizes ranging from
very small regional insurers with a customer base of less than 5000 up to big insurers with a customer
base of over 500,000 insureds. Like other health insurance markets, the Swiss market underwent
a consolidation process since the introduction of the Swiss health insurance law (Robinson (2004)).
In 1996, the number of insurers offering health insurance was 145 and has reduced significantly in the
last 20 years to a total of only 58 in 2015 (see Table 2) due to mergers and acquisitions of companies.
The number of insurers with a customer base of up to 5000 reduced significantly from 90 in 1996 to
11 in 2015, whereas the number of insurers with a customer base greater than 100,000 has increased.
Froidevaux and Kilchenmann (2016) suggest that insurers who offer low premiums receive many new
affiliation demands, but as the state of health of newly insureds is not known, these insurers have to
substantially increase their reserves to cover the unknown risk. They mention that this risk has put
several insurers into financial difficulties in the past, among them mainly small and medium sized
ones that targeted regional communities. Over the long run, some of these insurers have then been
absorbed by larger competitors.
Table 2. Number of insurers by portfolio size (number of customers).
Number of customers Up to 5000 5001–10,000 10,001–50,000 50,001–100,000 100,001–500,000 Over 500,000 Total
1996 90 14 20 6 12 3 145
1997 76 14 20 4 11 4 129
1998 64 13 21 6 10 4 118
1999 56 12 19 8 10 4 109
2000 48 11 19 9 10 4 101
2001 43 9 23 9 11 4 99
2002 33 10 25 9 13 3 93
2003 32 10 26 9 12 4 93
2004 32 11 24 9 12 4 92
2005 27 13 20 8 13 4 85
2006 28 14 20 7 14 4 87
2007 27 13 21 8 14 4 87
2008 26 13 19 9 15 4 86
2009 22 10 20 8 17 4 81
2010 19 10 22 9 16 5 81
2011 13 10 14 3 18 5 63
2012 14 8 13 3 18 5 61
2013 14 8 10 5 18 5 60
2014 14 8 10 5 18 5 60
2015 11 9 10 6 17 5 58
∆ 1996–2015 −88% −35% −50% 0% 42% 67% −60%
Groups of insurers often have more flexibility and are able to offer larger premium ranges for
different members in the group. Additionally, a group of insurers can consolidate the business by
restructuring the group. In 2015, more than 50% of the insurers were either part of a group or related
to a group by a collaboration contract, and these groups of insurers amount to 80% of the market
(Froidevaux and Kilchenmann 2016). As a result, the market share (in terms of number of insureds) of
the insurers with more than 100,000 customers increased from 82% in 1996 to 92% in 2015 (see Figure 1).
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Figure 2 illustrates the development of market shares from 1998 to 2015 of the eight largest insurers
as of 2015.
0.000	
0.100	
0.200	
0.300	
0.400	
0.500	
0.600	
19
96
	
19
97
	
19
98
	
19
99
	
20
00
	
20
01
	
20
02
	
20
03
	
20
04
	
20
05
	
20
06
	
20
07
	
20
08
	
20
09
	
20
10
	
20
11
	
20
12
	
20
13
	
20
14
	
20
15
	
1-5,000	 5,001-10,000	 10,001-50,000	 50,001	–	100,000	 100,001	–	500,000	 over	500,000	
Figure 1. Development of the market share by insurer size.
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Figure 2. Development of the market share of the eight largest insurers.
The insurers’ market shares largely differ among cantons. As an illustration, Figure 3 shows the
market shares in six cantons of the eight largest insurers in the respective canton per year between
2002 and 2015 where the largest insurer in each year is noted by 1, the second largest by 2 and the
eighth largest insurer by the number 8. In GE, the total market share of the eight largest insurers
grew from about 40% of the market in 2002 to 60% in 2015. In ZH, the market share is distributed
more equally between companies. In VD, during the first years, the market share was more equally
distributed, but in recent years, big insurers have captured large market shares, so that the market is
mainly dominated by a few bigger insurers today.
Risks 2019, 7, 114 6 of 25
0	
0.1	
0.2	
0.3	
0.4	
0.5	
0.6	
0.7	
0.8	
0.9	
1	
20
02
	
20
03
	
20
04
	
20
05
	
20
06
	
20
07
	
20
08
	
20
09
	
20
10
	
20
11
	
20
12
	
20
13
	
20
14
	
20
15
	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	
(a) AG
0	
0.1	
0.2	
0.3	
0.4	
0.5	
0.6	
0.7	
0.8	
0.9	
1	
20
02
	
20
03
	
20
04
	
20
05
	
20
06
	
20
07
	
20
08
	
20
09
	
20
10
	
20
11
	
20
12
	
20
13
	
20
14
	
20
15
	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	
(b) BE
0	
0.1	
0.2	
0.3	
0.4	
0.5	
0.6	
0.7	
0.8	
0.9	
1	
20
02
	
20
03
	
20
04
	
20
05
	
20
06
	
20
07
	
20
08
	
20
09
	
20
10
	
20
11
	
20
12
	
20
13
	
20
14
	
20
15
	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	
(c) GE
0	
0.1	
0.2	
0.3	
0.4	
0.5	
0.6	
0.7	
0.8	
0.9	
1	
20
02
	
20
03
	
20
04
	
20
05
	
20
06
	
20
07
	
20
08
	
20
09
	
20
10
	
20
11
	
20
12
	
20
13
	
20
14
	
20
15
	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	
(d) TI
0	
0.1	
0.2	
0.3	
0.4	
0.5	
0.6	
0.7	
0.8	
0.9	
1	
20
02
	
20
03
	
20
04
	
20
05
	
20
06
	
20
07
	
20
08
	
20
09
	
20
10
	
20
11
	
20
12
	
20
13
	
20
14
	
20
15
	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	
(e) VD
0	
0.1	
0.2	
0.3	
0.4	
0.5	
0.6	
0.7	
0.8	
0.9	
1	
20
02
	
20
03
	
20
04
	
20
05
	
20
06
	
20
07
	
20
08
	
20
09
	
20
10
	
20
11
	
20
12
	
20
13
	
20
14
	
20
15
	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	
(f) ZH
Figure 3. Market shares of eight largest insurers in different cantons 2002–2015.
2.2. Premium Development 1998–2015
Naturally, the premium size may drive the insureds to switch their insurance plan. Since health
expenditures keep growing, the insurers have to raise the premiums (see Table A1). The calculated
average yearly growth (CAGR) is 3.68% between 1998–2015, whereas the yearly average premium
raised from CHF 1754 in 1998 to CHF 3289 in 2015. In 2008, after five years of positive operating results
and a reduction by 1% of required reserve rate (expressed as a percentage of the premium volume) by
the authorities, the premium level has been reduced by 1% (see Comparis.ch (2008)). However, in the
years 2002, 2003 and 2010 the average growth in premiums was much higher than in the other years.
One explanation for this increase is the negative balance between the collected premiums and the paid
benefits in the years prior to the premium jump (see Table A1).
The population is aging with life expectancy increasing in Switzerland from 78.9 years in 1996 to
82.9 years in 2015 (World Bank (2017)) and the proportion of adults aged 26 or more in the population
is growing (cf. Figure 4), causing increasing health expenses.
The premiums are fixed by the insurers for each premium region in each canton. In each region,
all residents of the same age group (below 18 years, 18-25 years and 26 plus years) pay the same
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premium per insurance plan and chosen deductible at the same insurer. Regulations do not allow
premium discounts in the mandatory insurance scheme. To increase the choice for insureds and in
addition to the deductible levels (CHF 300, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000 and 2500 for adults), insurers offer
restricted models. The two main restricted models are the Health Maintenance Organization model
(HMO) in which the policyholder agrees to always first consult a specified doctor based at the HMO
centre and the family doctor model in which policyholders consult first their predefined family doctor
who will refer them to a specialist if needed. Other models include the “Telmed" model in which the
policyholder has to call a hotline for a first consultation and will then be referred to further treatment if
needed. The purpose of these models is to limit medical care within a predefined network of doctors in
order to lower health expenses and to offer lower premiums. According to SFOH data, in 1998 about
66% of the insureds in Switzerland had the standard basic insurance (with accident coverage and with
the lowest possible deductible, which is CHF 300 since 2004) whereas in 2015 only 21.1% were covered
by this insurance model. Against a background of ever rising premiums, the reduction in this share
is linked to the fact that policyholders change towards a more restrictive plan to benefit from lower
premiums. The proportion of insureds choosing the standard model (including accident coverage and
deductible of CHF 300) per canton is available for the years 2001 to 2015 and is presented in Figure 5.
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Figure 4. Share of the population aged 26 years or more.
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Figure 5. Share of insureds with the standard model.
As mentioned above, insurers perform a premium differentiation by offering several levels of
deductible for the three age groups and models with restrictions. Employees covered by accident
insurance through their employer can buy the basic insurance without accident cover. These options
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result in many variations of the basic health insurance premiums (Colombo (2001)). The average
premium is calculated for each insurer as the total premium income divided by the number of insured
from the data published by the SFOH. Although the law aims at increasing the competition between
the insurers, the difference between the highest premium and the lowest one has not changed much
(Figure 6) and the maximum average premium is approximately twice as large as the lowest one.
Leu et al. (2009) suggest that the premium differences among insurers are a result of poor risk
adjustment schemes. Figure 7 shows the premium differences between the cantons. Leu et al. (2009)
find a high positive correlation between the density of physicians and the premium level which
explains to some extent the premium differences across cantons (see Table 1).
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Figure 6. Premium range in Switzerland, 1998–2015.
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Figure 7. Average premium per canton, 1998–2015.
2.3. Switching Behaviour of the Policyholders
In view of the strict regulation on the insurers and a defined catalogue of benefits, one might
expect a strong price competition and high switching rates of the insureds to ensure paying the lowest
possible premium. This could then be followed by convergence of the prices so that the difference
between the lowest and the highest premiums would shrink over the years. However, as seen in
Figure 6 the premium range does not change a lot over the years and the yearly estimated switching
rate of policyholders published by SFOH are between 6.5–13% (see Figure 8). Note that in case of a
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merger between insurers, the insureds are counted as a new entries, although they do not have actively
changed. Hence, the actual switching rates are expected to be even lower. Figure 8 also suggests a
relationship between the average annual premium change and the switching rate.
Each year in September, the SFOH publishes the premiums for the coming year. At that time,
each insured can compare the change in premium of the own contract with the average change of all
insurers. Policyholders have time until the end of November to change their provider. The results of a
survey among policyholders concerning their switching behaviour (Federal Statistical Office (2007))
suggest that 77% of the ones that changed their insurer, did so due to premium increases, with higher
switching rates among those with a higher education level (5.5% against 3.6%). The linguistic region
has an effect on the switching rates as well, with a 8% rate in the French speaking region and only a
2.9% switching rate in the Italian speaking region. In 2010, the consumer website Bonus.ch (2010) did a
survey among 3700 insureds, where 80% of the customers who changed their insurer, did so in order
to reduce their premium.
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Figure 8. Switching rates and annual premium growth from 2004 to 2015.
Ortiz (2011) investigates three data sets of Swiss health insurance plans and their prices for the
period from 2004 to 2010. His findings suggest that many policyholders do not perform a sufficient
price optimisation when switching the insurer, resulting in choosing insurers with relatively high
premiums. Wilson and Price (2010) suggest that even in a transparent and simple market, the ability of
consumers to compare correctly between different suppliers is rather limited.
The satisfaction level in the health insurance market in Switzerland is very high (79%) and
insureds do not switch insurers when they are satisfied with their current one (Thomson et al. (2013)).
In the above mentioned survey from 2010 by Bonus.ch (2010), 4% of the insureds that changed their
insurer declared that they did so due to a lack of satisfaction with the services.
In addition to the basic mandatory cover, insureds can buy a complementary insurance.
Dormont et al. (2009) investigate the effect of existing complementary insurance on the switching
behaviour. The results show some evidence that insureds who purchase a complementary insurance
are more reluctant to switch the basic insurance provider. These results are supported by the survey
from 2010 done by Bonus.ch (2010), in which 13% of insureds responded that the main reason for them
to stay with their current insurer is having a complementary plan.
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3. Research Questions, Available Data and Model Assumptions
3.1. Research Questions and Variables
We would like to quantify the effect of selected factors on the insurer’s market share and define
the dependent variable DMSi,t,c as the absolute year-to-year difference of an insurer’s market share
with the one of the previous year, where i indicates the insurer, t the year and c the canton.
Premiums: Colombo (2001) conducted a study on the switching behaviour of the health insurance
customers in Switzerland and his findings suggest that while service level appears as minor parameter
supporting switching decisions, the premium level is the main motivation for customers to switch
their health plan. Nevertheless, the results of that study show that in order to reduce their premium
level, policyholders prefer to change their health insurance plan from the standard basic one to more
restrictive ones (like HMO) from the same insurer. Following these findings and the surveys mentioned
in Section 2.3, we want to test the significance of two different variables associated with the premiums.
First, we perform a statistical test whether the annual changes in market share of insurers depend on
the relative difference between the insurer’s premium and the market premium, denoted by RDPMi,t,c.
The first question hence is:
(Q1) Does a lower premium than the market premium come with a significant increase in the
market share?
Secondly, we define DRPCi,t,c as the absolute difference between the insurer’s relative annual
change in the premium and the one of the market premium. We assume a positive relationship between
premium increase and switching decisions:
(Q2) Is a higher relative annual increase in premium than in the market premium a significant driver of
a decreasing market share?
Satisfaction: Although a satisfied customer is not necessarily a loyal customer, Berry (1995)
claims that a good service level promotes the relationship with customers in service companies such as
insurance. Anderson et al. (1994) find a positive effect of satisfaction and performance. We define an
explanatory binary variable for the satisfaction of the policyholders SLi,t. Our third research question is:
(Q3) Do insurers with better customer satisfaction levels have significantly larger market shares?
Group: Companies that are members of a group have advantages such as knowledge sharing,
reduced administrative expenses from scale effects and stronger marketing. Following various research
findings such as Cummins and Xie (2008), we want to test whether belonging to a group supports
the insurer and allows to attract and retain more customers. We define a binary variable (GRi,t)
representing if the insurer is part of an insurance group or not. Our fourth question is:
(Q4) Does belonging to a group result in a significant increase of the market share?
Canton: As discussed in Section 2.3, the switching behaviour of the policyholders is related to
demographic parameters such as language and education level. The language spoken is strongly
linked to the cantons, i.e. we are interested in the following question:
(Q5) Do the independent variables significantly affect the market share of the insurers differently
through the cantons?
We summarise the variables introduced above in Table 3:
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Table 3. Description of the variables.
Variable Description Type
DMSi,t,c Absolute year-to-year difference in market share Number
RDPMi,t,c Relative difference between the insurer’s premium and the market premium Number
DRPCi,t,c Difference between the insurer’s and the market’s relative annual change of the premium Number
SLi,t Satisfaction level of the customers Binary: low, high
GRi,t Group affiliation Binary: yes, no
3.2. Available Data
3.2.1. Data Description
The Swiss Federal Statistical Office publishes yearly reports, including data of the health insurance
system in Switzerland. The available data for the years 2002–2015 include the premiums for different
insurance models offered by the insurers in the different cantons, the size of the portfolio of each
insurer per canton, the percentage of insureds with the basic standard model per canton and general
statistics about the insured population including age and sex. For each of the 26 cantons and each
year we consider the data from insurers with market share greater than 1% neglecting smaller insurers.
We analyse a dataset containing a total of 6117 data points with an accumulated market share from 80%
held by 16 insurers in Neuchâtel (NE) in 2003 to over 97% held by 22 insurers in Schaffhausen (SH) in
2014. The number of retained insurers per canton and per year varies from 10 in the canton Appenzell
Innerrhoden (AI) in 2002 (total market share of 96%) to 25 insurers in BE in 2008 (total market share
of 95%). More specifically, in GE and VD, the number of insurers with market share greater than 1%
decreased by 3 between the years 2002 to 2015 while in the German cantons, the number increased by 3.
In TI, the number increased from 17 insurers in 2002 to 22 in 2008, before decreasing back to 17 in 2015.
In our work, we only consider the basic standard insurance model including accident cover and a
deductible of CHF 300 for the group of adults aged 26+ years. From the data, we calculate:
• The Market Share (MSi,t,c) per insurer, year and canton as the size of an insurer’s customer base
divided by the population in the canton.
• The Market Premium (MPi,t,c) for insurer i as the weighted average premium (with market shares)
of all the other insurers in the market per year and canton.
• The absolute year-to-year change in market share DMSi,t,c= MSi,t,c −MSi,t−1,c as the difference
between the current year market share and the one of the previous year per insurer, year
and canton.
• The relative difference between the insurer’s premium and the market premium (RDPMi,t,c) as
the difference between the current year premium (Pi,t,c) and the current market premium (MPi,t,c)
divided by the current market premium, i.e. RDPMi,t,c = (Pi,t,c −MPi,t,c)/MPi,t,c.
• The difference between the relative annual change of the insurer’s premium and the relative annual
change in the market premium (DRPCi,t,c) per insurer, year and canton, which is defined by
DRPCi,t,c = [(Pi,t,c − Pi,t−1,c)/Pi,t−1,c]− [(MPi,t,c −MPi,t−1,c)/MPi,t−1,c].
Annual consumer satisfaction reports are published by (Bonus.ch 2010; Comparis.ch 2002–2015, 2008)
and include a calculated grade for each of the ranked insurers based on customer satisfaction. Generally,
the policyholders are satisfied with their insurers and give relatively high grades for the service level
with averages ranging from 4.80 to 5.03 out of 6 over the years. We assigned a binary satisfaction level
variable (SLi,t) with 0 (=low) for all non-ranked insurers and defined it as our baseline. The ranked
insurers are all given a ranking grade of 1 (=high). Since the source for available satisfaction reports
varies over the years and not all insurers are ranked, the reliability of these data is lower. This is why
we remain with only using a two-level rating.
The group affiliation variable (GRi,t) is binary and is assigned using information from insurers’
websites and reports. Our baseline value is 0 for insurers that are not affiliated to a group.
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Before proceeding with the analysis we would like to mention some limitations of our data:
• Information about market events such as mergers and acquisitions are not included.
• Our data includes only the total number of insureds per year per insurer per canton mixing all
available insurance models so we use the market share (MSi,t,c) as an estimation of the insurers’
cantonal market share. This is relevant since for the premium level we remain with using the
standard model premium for reference.
• The yearly switching rates between insurers are unknown and there is no information about the
number of policyholders that change their insurance model within the same insurer.
3.2.2. Descriptive statistics
Table A2 in the Appendix A presents descriptive statistics of the variables for the entire dataset.
We give the mean of the market share for each year which ranges between 5.2–6.3% and basic statistics
(the mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation) of the dependent variable DMSi,t,c, the
explanatory variables RDPMi,t,c and DRPCi,t,c as well as SLi,t and GRi,t.
We suggest that some of extremal values in DMSi,t,c can be explained by specific events in the
market like mergers and acquisitions of insurers, reduction in financial reserves below the required
level which results in an important raise in premiums or the restructuring of an insurance group.
The minimum and maximum yearly values of DMSi,t,c are in 2010 and 2011 with both years having
high switching rates (see Figure 8). 2010 was a year with high increases in premiums while between
2010 to 2011 the number of insurers has reduced from 81 to 63. These events partially explain the
extremal values of DMSi,t,c in 2010 and 2011.
The minimum yearly values of RDPMi,t,c are between −0.182 to −0.245. Some insurers offer an
attractive premium with average RDPMi,t,c over all cantons and all years of −12%. Other insurers set
premiums above average with an average value of RDPMi,t,c of 14%. Groups of insurers often offer
different premium ranges for the basic health insurance. For example, in one group, two insurers may
offer different premiums for the basic standard model with one being significantly higher than the
market premium and the other one being lower than the market premium.
Reduction in financial reserves below the required level can result in an important raise in
premiums in the following years. The largest observed DRPCi,t,c is 32% in 2013 when an insurer fell
below the statuary reserve ratio and had to increase premiums by up to 34% in canton Nidwald (NW)
while the market premium increased by only 2%. Unexpected increases in claims or administration
costs can be another reason for a significant rise of premiums. Such has happened in 2012 in canton
Zug (ZG) with one insurer raising premiums by 20%. In 2015, the minimum value of DRPCi,t,c is
−22% for an insurer that reduced premiums in the canton Obwalden (OW) by 16% while the market
premium increased by 6%.
Cooperation between insurers in the same group and mergers and acquisitions might be related
to extremal values as well. In 2003, a ZH based insurer joined an insurers’ group and while its market
share reduced in the canton by 30%, another insurer from the group increased its portfolio size by a
factor of 5 from 4900 insureds in 2002 to 24,500 in 2003. In 2009, a merger of a Luzern based insurer
with another insurance company increased the market share by 3.69 in the canton.
When we plot RDPMi,t,c and DRPCi,t,c versus DMSi,t,c for all Switzerland (Figure 9a,b), one can
observe that the relationship is not linear. One possible explanation is that the plot mixes data points
from all cantons and that the influence of the variables on the market shares differs in different cantons,
in a superposition of different slopes. The value of the correlation coefficient between DMSi,t,c and
RDPMi,t,c is −0.420 and between DMSi,t,c and DRPCi,t,c the value is −0.266 for the 6117 data points.
Figure 10 presents the relationship between RDPMi,t,c and DMSi,t,c for six selected cantons. Indeed,
on the canton level the relationship turns out to be more linear, with the slopes differing across cantons.
In fact, French cantons have a steeper slope than others, indicating stronger reactions by insureds in
those regions. A similar picture occurs when plotting DRPCi,t,c versus DMSi,t,c (Figure 11), with again
more pronounced slopes for the French cantons.
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Figure 9. The relationship between DMS and explanatory variables. (a) RDPMi,t,c versus DMSi,t,c; (b)
DRPCi,t,c versus DMSi,t,c.
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Figure 10. RDPM versus DMS in selected cantons.
Overall the distribution of the SLi,t values through all 26 cantons is shown in Figure 12a.
The variation in the distribution between the cantons can been seen with ZH and TI having over 85%
data points of high ranked insurers and only 15% of low ranked insurers. BE has more than 28% data
points of lower ranked insurers. One explanation could be that the insureds in BE are more sensitive
and critical to service level. Figure 12b shows the percentage of data points of insurers with group
affiliation per year from 2002 to 2015 (variable GRi,t). The percentage of insurers that are not affiliated
with a group reduced during the years from 47% in 2002 to 27% in 2015.
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Figure 11. DRPC versus DMS in selected cantons.
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Figure 12. Group distribution and satisfaction distribution. (a) Satisfaction distribution per canton;
(b) Group distribution per year.
3.3. Regression Models
To address the research questions (Q1) - (Q4), we first construct a set of linear models (R1). As the
number of data points is limited for each canton, we define (R1) with single regressions testing the
hypotheses of a linear relationship one by one, namely that the difference in market share (DMSi,t,c)
depends on the relative difference between the premium and the market premium (RDPMi,t,c), the
difference between the relative annual change in the premium and the market premium (DRPCi,t,c),
the service level (SLi,t) and the group affiliation (GRi,t) in a significant way. To see the influence of the
cantons on the outcome (Q5), we run the regression for the six selected cantons separately. We define
(R1) as:
DMSi,t,c = β0 + β jVARi,t,c + ei,t,c with VARi,t,c ∈ {RDPMi,t,c, DRPCi,t,c, GRi,t, SLi,t} (R1)
where β0 is the intercept, β j is the coefficient for the independent continuous variables RDPMi,t,c,
DRPCi,t,c and the binary categorial variables SLi,t and GRi,t and ei,t,c are error terms.
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Secondly, we propose a multivariable linear model (R2) including both continuous
premium-related variables:
DMSi,t,c = β0 + β1RDPMi,t,c + β2DRPCi,t,c + ei,t,c. (R2)
Here β0 is the intercept, β j are the coefficients for the independent continuous variables RDPMi,t,c
and DRPCi,t,c, and ei,t,c are error terms.
Figure 13 shows the histogram of DMSi,t,c for the entire dataset together with a normal and a
two-sided lognormal fit. Clearly the normality assumption is violated, and the two-sided lognormal
assumption seems to be a much better description for the data. For a quantitative comparison in
terms of AIC on the resulting residuals, we refer to Section 4. We therefore suggest to perform the
linear regressions (R1) and (R2) with two-sided lognormally distributed residuals. The corresponding
needed statistical methodology seems not be available in the statistical literature and is hence given
in the Appendix A. In Section 4 we compare the results and Q-Q plots of the residuals from the
regressions with normal residuals and with the two-sided lognormal residuals. We will see that for
individual cantons the normality assumption is better fulfilled, however, the regression with two-sided
lognormally distributed residuals turns out to fit better in these cases as well.
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Figure 13. Distribution of the dependent variable DMSi,t,c with normal (blue) and two-sided lognormal
(green) fit.
4. Testing the Regression Models and Results
First we test the classical regression with normally distributed residuals. The results for model
(R1) with normal residuals are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix A including the coefficients
with their standard deviation and the adjusted R2 as the criterion for goodness of fit. They show that
the explanatory variables, RDPMi,t,c and DRPCi,t,c, are very significant in the six cantons and for
Switzerland. Service level and group affiliation are not significant explanatory variables in most of
the cantons.
We also conduct a linear regression analysis with normal residuals for the multivariate regression
model (R2) with RDPMi,t,c and DRPCi,t,c as explanatory variables in the selected cantons and for
the entire dataset and we report the results in Table A4 including the variable coefficients (β),
the significance level with standard deviation (in brackets), the standardised coefficients (Std.β),
the adjusted R2 and number of observations. Both explanatory variables are very significant,
nevertheless a comparison of their coefficients shows that the standardised coefficients of RDPMi,t,c
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are higher than the ones of DRPCi,t,c which suggests that a change in RDPMi,t,c has a higher effect
on DMSi,t,c than a change in DRPCi,t,c. The coefficient values vary as a function of the canton with
highest values in GE and lowest in AG. The adjusted R2 values are higher than in the set of single
regressions and are between 16.8% in AG and 35% in GE and ZH.
The analysis of the residuals from the regression with the entire dataset of Switzerland
(see Figure 14a) confirms that the normality assumption is not met in this case, so the validity of
the results is non-satisfactory. For the individual cantons (see Figure 14b for TI as an example), the
results show a better agreement to the normality assumption.
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Figure 14. QQ-plot of normally distributed residuals versus theoretical quantiles.
In order to enhance the credibility of the findings, we conduct the linear regression (R2) with
two-sided lognormal residual distribution (according to the procedure outlined in the Appendix A)
and we report the results in Table 4 including the variable coefficients and their significance. We verify
the significance levels of the explanatory variables with Nsim = 5000 (see Appendix A).
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Table 4. Multivariate regression results with two-sided lognormal residuals.
AG BE GE TI VD ZH CH
RDPMi,t,c −0.0150 *** −0.0140 *** −0.0412 *** −0.0101 *** −0.0192 *** −0.0204 *** −0.0164 ***
DRPCi,t,c −0.0033 −0.0215 *** −0.0925 *** −0.0337 ** −0.0236 ** −0.0195 *** −0.0175 ***
Intercept −0.0008 −0.0006 0.0015 −0.0006 0.0004 −0.0006 −0.0006
Observations 283 293 184 259 228 268 6117
The reported values show the regression coefficients with significance code. Significance codes: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.01; Nsim = 5, 000.
The analysis of the residuals in the case of the entire dataset of Switzerland (Figure 15a) confirms
the excellent fit of the two-sided lognormal model with AIC = −47,257 compared with −42,120 under
the normality assumption. Figure 15b shows the Q-Q plot of the residuals for TI (as an example for
the performance on the cantonal level) and confirms a better fit than the model with normal residuals
(compare with Figure 14b). The two-sided lognormal model fits the data better in the other individual
cantons as well.
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Figure 15. QQ-plot of Two-sided lognormally distributed residuals versus theoretical quantiles.
When considering the results from the regressions with normality assumption and two-sided
lognormal assumption, we notice that:
• RDPMi,t,c, the relative difference between the insurer’s and the market premium, is the most
significant explanatory variable with very high significance level in all cantons and with the
aggregated data for all Switzerland in both regressions. The coefficient values of RDPMi,t,c are
always negative which indicates the negative relation between the dependent variable DMSi,t,c
and the explanatory variable RDPMi,t,c. The coefficient values with normal residuals are always
higher (in absolute value) than the ones with the two-sided lognormal residuals.
• DRPCi,t,c, the difference between the insurer’s and market annual premium change, is a
significant explanatory variable with negative coefficient values, meaning that a larger value of the
difference between the relative change in annual premium and the relative change of the market
premium causes a diminution in market share. However, for the model with two-sided lognormal
residuals, in AG the DRPCi,t,c is not a significant explanatory variable and the coefficient value is
only -0.0033 compared to -0.0195 under the assumption of normal residuals.
• The intercept of the multivariate regression (R2) has positive values in GE and VD and negative
values in the German cantons. As the number of insurers in GE and VD reduced along the years
of our study, naturally, even with zero values of the explanatory variables, the insurers’ market
shares grow and vice-versa for the German cantons.
We summarise the results in the following: The relative difference between the insurer’s and the
market premium is the most significant variable and the coefficients of RDPMi,t,c have negative value.
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A lower premium than the market premium can hence be seen as a significant driver of increasing
market share, cf. (Q1). Further the difference between the relative annual change in the insurer’s
premium and the relative annual change in the market premium is a significant explanatory variable
with negative coefficient values. Higher relative annual increase in premium than the market premium
thus significantly leads to decreasing market shares, giving an affirmative answer to (Q2) for the data
set under study. As for (Q3), the study on our data suggest that satisfaction level is not a significant
variable in this context. Concerning (Q4), group affiliation does not seem to affect the dependent
variable. Finally, as a response to (Q5), the regression results differ among the cantons which suggests
that the canton is a relevant factor.
5. Concluding Remarks
The Swiss health insurance market has changed dramatically in the years since the introduction
of the mandatory health insurance in 1996. The number of insurers offering health insurance plans
decreased extensively from 145 insurers in 1996 to 58 in 2015 and the annual premiums increased
from an average annual premium of CHF 1917 in 1996 to CHF 3286 in 2015. We analyse the effect of
different variables such as premium, satisfaction level and group affiliation on the market shares of the
insurers in the different cantons. We define a model with the market share as dependent variable and
four explanatory variables and study their significance in data of the mandatory health insurance for
the years from 2002 to 2015.
Our regression results support the intuition that the difference between the insurer’s premium
and the market premium is strongly negatively correlated to the market share. Our results also
suggest a significant impact of premium change from one year to another. Satisfaction level, however,
can not conclusively be confirmed to be statistically relevant. One explanation can be that customers
in Switzerland are in general satisfied with their insurer and the small differences in satisfaction levels
do not affect the market shares much. Our findings also suggest that belonging to a group of insurers
does not result in a significantly higher market share. Note that as a particular by-product of our study
the numerical values of the obtained coefficients in the regression models helps to assess the sensitivity
of the market on the various drivers.
If one has reasons to believe that the explanatory variables in the regression analysis are subject to
a considerable amount of noise, one could also implement a non-parametric bootstrap procedure as for
instance suggested in Pešta (2013), which we leave for future studies. Additional investigation of other
explanatory variables such as age, education level, health status and possession of complementary
insurance is suggested for future research according to the availability of such data. As the available
panel dataset is growing every year with the publication of new data, it will be possible to add
explanatory variables without the risk of overfitting the models.
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Appendix A. A Regression Model with Two-Sided Lognormal Residuals and Its Estimation
Data sometimes exhibit a linear relation between variables to a satisfactory degree, but instead of
normally distributed residuals, the latter follow another distribution. For non-normally distributed
residuals within the context of risk modelling see e.g., Prettenthaler et al. (2012). In the context of
the application in this paper, it turns out that two-sided lognormally distributed residuals provide
an excellent fit. Therefore, we develop a regression model which can be fitted to data that exhibit
two-sided lognormally distributed residuals.
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More specifically, let us consider a p-dimensional vector of independent variates X and a
real-valued response variable Y. We propose the model
Y = βX + εµ,
where β is a p-dimensional vector of slopes and εµ is a random variable with density
fµ(x) =
1
Φ(1)
√
8pi(|x|+ eµ−1) e
−(ln(|x|+eµ−1)−µ)2/2,
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Such a density arises naturally when
considering the density of the transformation eN+µ, where N is a standard normal random variable,
and then reflecting it at its mode, and finally centering it such that the symmetry point is the origin.
Observe that a direct consequence of this construction is that it has mean zero. Another consequence is
that the tails on both sides of the origin are heavy-tailed, with lognormal behaviour. We hence denote
the above density as a two-sided lognormal density, with the name carrying over for the variable εµ,
the cumulative distribution function Fµ(x) =
∫ x
−∞ fµ(y)dy, and so on.
We are interested in the estimation of the slope parameter vector β above. For the fitting of a
Gaussian linear model, least squares are used, which coincides with maximum likelihood estimation.
Here, we adopt the maximum likelihood approach as well, but now the geometrical interpretation of
least squares is lost, due to the form of the density fµ. Given some observed covariates x = (x1, . . . , xn),
where each xi is a p-dimensional vector, and variates y = (y1, . . . , yn), where each yi is a real number,
the likelihood of the model for the parameters β and µ is given by
L(β, µ|x, y) =
n
∏
i=1
fµ(yi − βxi),
and the maximum likelihood estimates are
(β̂, µ̂) = arg max(β,µ)L(β, µ|x, y),
which can be computed numerically.
Appendix A.1. Testing Significance between Nested Models
Whenever two nested models, with resulting maximum likelihood estimators
(β̂0, µ̂0), (β̂1, µ̂1), dim(β̂0) = q < p = dim(β̂1),
are fitted, it is of importance to know the significance of the additional parameters in β̂1 with respect
to the more basic model. The way this is done for Gaussian errors is by regarding the simpler model
as true, and under this assumption determining the distribution of the extra parameters in the more
complicated model. The resulting distribution helps to assess how likely it is to see parameters of
the magnitude that were estimated (or even larger), obtaining in such a way a p-value. Presently,
the distribution of the extra parameters given the simpler model is complicated to obtain, so we use
Monte Carlo simulation.
Furthermore, given an estimator β̂1, testing for the significance of a single entry of the vector,
say, βˆ1(i), i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, is equivalent to fitting a model without that entry, and comparing that
simpler model with the full model. That is, regarding the q = p− 1-dimensional model as true, and
determining the distribution of βˆ1(i) for the p-dimensional model, such that we can say how likely it
is to observe a value such as βˆ1(i), or of larger magnitude. Since this is the most common and directly
interpretable way of assessing significance, we describe the Monte Carlo algorithm only for q = p− 1.
Analogous algorithms can be deduced for q < p− 1, but significance intervals must then be replaced
by suitable significance regions.
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Algorithm 1. 1. Fit the two-sided lognormal regression model (M1) with p slope parameters to the
data (x, y). Let the resulting maximum likelihood estimator be denoted by
(β̂1, µ̂1) = (β̂1(1), . . . , β̂1(p), µ̂1).
2. Fit the two-sided lognormal regression model (M0) with p− 1 slope parameters which is formed
by deleting the i-th slope parameter from the model in the previous step to the data (x, y). Let the
resulting maximum likelihood estimator be denoted by
(β̂0, µ̂0) = (β̂0(1), . . . , β̂0(p− 1), µ̂0).
3. Simulate Nsim times from model M0, that is, create
ysimj = β̂0 x\i + ε µ̂0 , x\i := x\xi, j = 1, . . . , Nsim.
4. Fit Nsim p-dimensional (full) two-sided lognormal regression models to each simulated response,
resulting in the replicated estimators (β̂j1, µ̂
j
1), j = 1, . . . , Nsim, and denote the empirical
distribution function of β̂j1(i), j = 1, . . . , Nsim, by F̂β1(i)(x), x ∈ R.
5. Define the p-value of the parameter β̂1(i) as p = F̂β1(i)(−|β̂1(i)|) + 1− F̂β1(i)(|β̂1(i)|).
Appendix A.2. Goodness of Fit
Having fitted and chosen a model, it is customary to look at the residuals rk = yk − β̂x, k = 1, . . . n,
as a goodness of fit diagnostic. Analogous to the Gaussian linear models, we look for homogeneous
dispersion of the residuals, with their distribution now being two-sided lognormal rather than normal,
we suggest here a QQ-plot of Φ−1(Fµ̂(rk)), k = 1, . . . n, against theoretical standard normal quantiles,
and visually expect a straight line when the fit is adequate.
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Table A1. Key figures on the Swiss health insurance market from 1998 to 2015.
Year Number of Insurers
Average Number Average Premium Gross Expenses
Total Premium (CHF mio.) Gross Expenses (CHF mio.)
Total Operating
of Insureds Per Insured Per Insured Result
(1000) (CHF) (CHF) (CHF mio.)
1998 118 7247 1754 1935 12,708 14,024 −0.03
1999 109 7271 1793 2011 13,034 14,621 −49.39
2000 101 7265 1850 2131 13,442 15,478 −305.95
2001 99 7301 1917 2244 13,997 16,386 −789.7
2002 93 7345 2091 2328 15,355 17,096 −223.67
2003 93 7373 2281 2431 16,820 17,924 399.73
2004 92 7384 2442 2592 18,030 19,140 514.14
2005 85 7436 2487 2736 18,496 20,348 171.42
2006 87 7478 2583 2755 19,315 20,603 490.95
2007 87 7538 2612 2863 19,689 21,579 178.66
2008 86 7616 2586 2984 19,692 22,722 −755.32
2009 81 7709 2611 3069 20,125 23,656 −471.61
2010 81 7780 2834 3123 22,051 24,292 224.51
2011 63 7863 3005 3171 23,631 24,932 587.67
2012 61 7953 3075 3257 24,458 25,901 915.88
2013 60 8046 3105 3471 24,984 27,926 −141.2
2014 60 8147 3172 3515 25,845 28,639 295.74
2015 58 8245 3289 3653 27,119 30,122 −606.89
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Table A2. Basic statistics of the variables: DMSi,t,c, RDPMi,t,c, DRPCi,t,c, SLi,t and GRi,t.
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
MSi,t,c
Mean 0.063 0.061 0.060 0.058 0.057 0.055 0.053 0.053 0.052 0.055 0.054 0.053 0.053 0.054
StD 0.072 0.069 0.068 0.066 0.065 0.063 0.061 0.060 0.059 0.061 0.060 0.060 0.059 0.060
DMSi,t,c
Min −0.057 −0.051 −0.039 −0.030 −0.052 −0.041 −0.034 −0.046 −0.069 −0.068 −0.042 −0.025 −0.017 −0.056
Mean −0.001 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000 0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
StD 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.008
Max 0.067 0.063 0.066 0.044 0.031 0.026 0.073 0.064 0.093 0.093 0.031 0.020 0.021 0.038
RDPMi,t,c
Min −0.254 −0.226 −0.209 −0.182 −0.203 −0.196 −0.210 −0.220 −0.224 −0.216 −0.194 −0.207 −0.236 −0.250
Mean −0.011 −0.007 −0.003 −0.010 −0.009 −0.006 −0.011 −0.008 −0.004 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.007
StD 0.099 0.086 0.080 0.080 0.084 0.090 0.093 0.098 0.099 0.108 0.104 0.099 0.096 0.099
Max 0.338 0.348 0.394 0.352 0.421 0.434 0.435 0.420 0.317 0.375 0.358 0.365 0.337 0.410
DRPCi,t,c
Min −0.258 −0.115 −0.177 −0.073 −0.135 −0.140 −0.127 −0.083 −0.245 −0.064 −0.102 −0.069 −0.092 −0.225
Mean 0.006 0.013 0.010 −0.004 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.008
StD 0.052 0.050 0.041 0.031 0.036 0.031 0.024 0.032 0.044 0.044 0.035 0.031 0.026 0.033
Max 0.220 0.206 0.172 0.178 0.174 0.152 0.073 0.151 0.156 0.203 0.191 0.321 0.088 0.203
SLi,t
High 0.773 0.822 0.823 0.816 0.814 0.806 0.779 0.799 0.743 0.850 0.829 0.771 0.803 0.764
GRi,t
Yes 0.526 0.538 0.568 0.577 0.589 0.595 0.605 0.622 0.625 0.686 0.707 0.714 0.732 0.731
Observations 388 398 412 418 431 439 458 458 456 420 457 462 467 453
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Table A3. Single variable regression results (R1) with normally distributed residuals.
AG BE GE TI VD ZH CH
RDPMi,t,c −0.0285 *** (0.0039) −0.0343 *** (0.0044) −0.0734 *** (0.0101) −0.0338 *** (0.0049) −0.0542 *** (0.0078) −0.0380 *** (0.0034) −0.0381 *** (0.0011)
Intercept −0.0006 (0.0004) −0.0005 (0.0004) 0.0025 *** (0.0009) −0.0004 (0.0004) 0.0021 *** (0.0007) −0.0006 ** (0.0003) −0.0003 *** (0.0001)
Adjusted R2 0.1552 0.1681 0.2220 0.1523 0.1730 0.3215 0.1759
DRPCi,t,c −0.0304 *** (0.0115) −0.0384 *** (0.0118) −0.1512 *** (0.0238) −0.0861 *** (0.0127) −0.0815 *** (0.0202) −0.0414 *** (0.0090) −0.0616 *** (0.0029)
Intercept 0.0001 (0.0004) 0.0001 (0.0004) 0.0009 (0.0009) 0.0002 (0.0004) 0.0010 (0.0007) 0.0002 (0.0003) 0.0002 ** (0.0001)
Adjusted R2 0.0207 0.0320 0.1775 0.1478 0.0634 0.0698 0.0704
Satisfaction Level (baseline: Low)
High 0.0010 ** (0.0005) 0.0009 ** (0.0005) −0.0006 (0.0011) 0.0003 (0.0006) −0.0005 (0.0009) 0.0004 (0.0004) 0.0010 *** (0.0001)
Intercept 0.0005 * (0.0005) 0.0003 (0.0005) −0.0002 (0.0011) 0.0001 (0.0006) 0.0003 (0.0009) 0.0003 (0.0009) 0.0004 *** (0.0001)
Adjusted R2 0.0118 0.0108 −0.0039 −0.0032 −0.0033 −0.0001 0.0080
Group affiliation (baseline: No)
Yes −0.0004 (0.0008) −0.0015 * (0.0008) 0.0001 (0.0021) 0.0012 (0.0009) −0.0012 (0.0016) −0.0007 (0.0006) −0.0014 *** (0.0002)
Intercept 0.0002 (0.0007) 0.0008 (0.0006) 0.0001 (0.0018) −0.0010 (0.0008) 0.0014 (0.0013) 0.0005 (0.0005) 0.0007 *** (0.0002)
Adjusted R2 −0.0028 0.0081 −0.0055 0.0025 −0.0019 0.0009 0.0062
Observations 283 293 184 259 228 268 6117
Significance codes: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Table A4. Multivariate regression results (R2) with normally distributed residuals.
AG BE GE TI VD ZH CH
RDPMi,t,c −0.0275 *** (0.0040) −0.0328 *** (0.0044) −0.0652 *** (0.0093) −0.0285 *** (0.0047) −0.0496 *** (0.0078) −0.0360 *** (0.0033) −0.0348 *** (0.0011)
Std.β −0.3832 −0.3948 −0.4224 −0.3326 −0.3845 −0.5388 −0.3831
DRPCi,t,c −0.0195 *** (0.0108) −0.0270 ** (0.0109) −0.1293 *** (0.0214) −0.0721 *** (0.0122) −0.0583 *** (0.0189) −0.0274 *** (0.0077) −0.0448 *** (0.0027)
Std.β −0.1000 −0.1322 −0.3650 −0.3255 −0.1860 −0.1792 −0.1932
Intercept −0.0004 (0.0004) −0.0003 (0.0004) 0.0030 (0.0010) 0.0000 (0.0004) 0.0020 (0.0010) −0.0004 (0.0003) 0.0000 (0.0001)
Adjusted R2 0.1620 0.1824 0.3496 0.2519 0.2029 0.3503 0.2118
Observations 283 293 184 259 228 268 6117
The reported values show the regression coefficients with standard deviations in brackets and the standardised values with significance code. Significance codes: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Risks 2019, 7, 114 24 of 25
References
Abraham, Jean M., Roger Feldman, Caroline Carlin, and Jon Christianson. 2006 . The effect of quality information
on consumer health plan switching: evidence from the Buyers Health Care Action Group. Journal of
Health Economics 25: 762–81. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
Anderson, Eugene W., Claes Fornell, and Donald R. Lehmann. 1994. Customer satisfaction, market and
profitability: findings from Sweden. Journal of Marketing 58: 53–66. [CrossRef]
Albrecher, Hansjörg. 2016. Asymmetric information and insurance. Cahiers de l’institute Louis Bachelier 20: 12–15.
Albrecher, Hansjörg, and Dalit Daily-Amir. 2017. On Effects of asymmetric information on non-life insurance
prices under competition. International Journal of Data Analysis Techniques and Strategies 9: 287–99. [CrossRef]
Berry, Leonard L. 1995. Relationship marketing of services - growing interest, emerging perspectives. Journal of the
Academy of Marketing Science 23: 236–45. [CrossRef]
Boonen, Lieke H.H.M., Trea Laske-Aldershof, and Frederik T. Schut. 2015. Switching health insurers: the role of
price, quality and consumer information search. The European Journal of Health Economics: Health Economics in
Prevention and Care 17: 339–53. [CrossRef]
Bonus.ch. 2010. Primes-maladie 2010: Comment les Suisses vont-ils réagir face à la hausse massive annoncée?
Available online: www.bonus.ch (accessed on 1 February 2018).
Browne, Mark, and Annette Hofmann. 2013. One-sided commitment in dynamic insurance contracts:
Evidence from private health insurance in Germany. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 46: 81–112.
Christiansen, Marcus C., Martin Eling, Jan-Philipp Schmidt, and Lorenz Zirkelbach. 2016. Who is changing health
insurance coverage? Empirical evidence on policyholder dynamics. Journal of Risk and Insurance 83: 269–300.
[CrossRef]
Colombo, Francesca. 2001. Towards More Choice in Social Protection? Individual Choice of Insurer in Basic Mandatory Health
Insurance in Switzerland. OECD Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers, 53. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Comparis.ch 2002–2015. Caisses maladies: sondage sur la satisfaction des assurés. Available online: www.
comparis.ch (accessed on 1 February 2018).
Comparis.ch. 2008. Primes maladie 2008. Available online: www.comparis.ch (accessed on 1 February 2018).
Cummins, J. David, and Xiaoying Xie. 2008. Mergers and acquisitions in the US property liability insurance
industry: productivity and efficiency effects. Journal of Banking and Finance 32: 30–55. [CrossRef]
Dormont, Brigitte, Pierre?Yves Geoffard, and Karine Lamiraud. 2009. The influence of supplementary health
insurance on switching behaviour: evidence from Swiss data. Health Economics 18: 1339–56. [CrossRef]
Dutang, Christophe, Hansjörg Albrecher, and Stéphane Loisel. 2013. Competition between non-life insurers
under solvency constraints: a game-theoretic approach. European Journal of Operational Research 231: 702–11.
[CrossRef]
Eling, Martin, and Dieter Kiesenbauer. 2011. What policy features determine life insurance lapse? An analysis of
the German market. Journal of Risk and Insurance 61: 616–37. [CrossRef]
Federal Statistical Office. 2007. Enquête suisse sur la santé 2007. Tableaux standards ESS07. Berlin: FSO.
Federal Statistical Office. 2018. Cantonal portraits 2018. FSO number 1346-1800-05. Available online: www.bfs.
admin.ch (accessed on 1 Februar 2018).
Frank, Richard G., and Karine Lamiraud. 2009. Choice, price competition and complexity in markets for health
insurance. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71: 550–62.
Froidevaux, Aline, and Christoph Kilchenmann. 2016. Retour Statistique sur les 20 ans de la LAMal. CHSS, 3; Bern:
Federal Office of Social Insurance and OFAS Publishing.
Goldman, Dana P., Arleen A. Leibowitz, and David A. Robalino. 2004. Employee responses to health insurance
premium increases. American Journal of Managed Care 10: 41–47. [PubMed]
Groninger, Yamin, and Alexander Lacher. 2017. Fund for the Sick? Or Partner for Health? Strategic Analysis of
the Swiss Health Insurance Market. Basel: Ernst & Young Ltd publication. Available online: www.ey.com
(accessed on 1 February 2018).
Hellier, Phillip K., Gus M. Geursen, Rodney A. Carr and John Rickard A. 2003. Customer repurchase intention:
A general structural equation model. European Journal of Marketing 37: 1762–800. [CrossRef]
Leu Robert E., Frans F. H. Rutten, Werner Brouwer, Pius Matter, and Christian Rütschi. 2009. Swiss and Dutch Health
Insurance Systems: Universal Coverage and Regulated Competitive Insurance Markets. Commonwealth Fund pub.,
No. 1220.
Risks 2019, 7, 114 25 of 25
Mau, Stefan, Irina Pletikosa Cvijikj, and Joël Wagner. 2018. Forecasting the next likely purchase events of
insurance customers: A case study on the value of data-rich multichannel environments. International Journal
of Bank Marketing 36: 1125–44. [CrossRef]
Ordinance of the Federal Department of Home Affairs on Premium Regions 832.106. 2015. Available online: https:
//www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/20152039/index.html (accessed on 1 February 2018).
Ortiz Yves. 2011. Prices and choices in the Swiss health care insurance market. Working Papers 11.09. Gerzensee: Swiss
National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
Pešta, Michal. 2013. Total least squares and bootstrapping with applications in calibration. Statistics 47: 966–91.
[CrossRef]
Pinquet, Jean, Montserrat Guillén, and Mercedes Ayuso. 2011. Commitment and lapse behavior in long-term
insurance: A case study. The Journal of Risk and Insurance 78: 983–1002. [CrossRef]
Prettenthaler Franz, Hansjörg Albrecher, Judith Köberl, and Dominik Kortschak. 2012. Risk and insurability of
storm damages to residential buildings in Austria. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance: Issues and Practice
37: 340–64. [CrossRef]
Robinson, James C. 2004. Consolidation and the transformation of competition in health insurance. Health Affairs
23: 11–24. [CrossRef]
Schmeiser, Hato, Tina Störmer, and Joël Wagner. 2014. Unisex insurance pricing: consumers? perception and
market implications. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance: Issues and Practice 39: 322–50. [CrossRef]
Schmitz, Hendrik, and Nicolas R. Ziebarth. 2017. Does price framing affect the consumer price sensitivity of
health plan choice? Journal of Human Resources 52: 88–127. [CrossRef]
Schut, Frederik T., Stefan Greß, and Juergen Wasem. 2003. Consumer price sensitivity and social health insurer
choice in Germany and the Netherlands. International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics 3: 117–38.
[CrossRef] [PubMed]
Samuelson William, and Richard Zeckhauser. 1988. Status quo bias in decision making. Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty 1: 7–59. [CrossRef]
Staudt, Yves, and Joël Wagner. 2018. What customer, policy and distribution characteristics drive the development
of insurance customer relationships? A case study analysis. International Journal of Bank Marketing
36: 1098–124. [CrossRef]
Strombom, Bruce A., Thomas C. Buchmueller, and Paul J. Feldstein. 2002. Switching costs, price sensitivity and
health plan choice. Journal of Health Economics 21: 89–116. [CrossRef]
Swiss Confederation. 1994. Federal law of health insurance. Available online: www.admin.ch (accessed on
1 February 2018).
Swiss Health Insurance Ordinance 832.102. 1995. Available online: https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-
compilation/19950219/index.html (accessed on 1 February 2018).
Swiss Health Insurance Benefits Ordinance 832.112.31. 1995. Available online: https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/
classified-compilation/19950275/index.html (accessed on 1 February 2018).
Theurl, Engelbert. 1999. Some aspects of the reform of the health care systems in Austria, Germany and
Switzerland. Health Care Analysis 7: 331–54. [CrossRef]
Thomson Sarah, Reinhard Busse, Luca Crivelli, Wynand Van de Ven, and Carine Van de Voord. 2013.
Statutory health insurance competition in Europe: A four-country comparison. Health Policy 109: 209–25.
[CrossRef]
Wilson, Chris, and Catherine Price. 2010. Do consumers switch to the best supplier? Oxford Economic Papers
62: 647–68. [CrossRef]
World Bank. 2017. Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (Years). Washington: World Bank Publication.
Wuppermann, Amelie C., Sebastian Bauhoff, and Markus Grabka. 2014. The Price Sensitivity of Health Plan
Choice: Evidence from Retirees in the German Social Health Insurance. Papers in Economics No. 21080,
Department of Economics, University of Munich, Munich, Germany.
c© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
